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Over the past decade, the rapid increase in oil and gas production
from shale deposits in the United States has profoundly changed energy
markets in North America. In the early 2000s, a combination of
improved horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing technology has
considerably enhanced the economic potential of shale gas deposits.
An environment of increasing natural gas prices in the ﬁrst half of
the last decade have made these natural gas reserves commercially
exploitable.
The rapid expansion of U.S. fossil fuel production has had a number of
macroeconomic impacts, notably in the form of increased activity from
intensive drilling, lowered natural gas prices, and a reduction in fossil
fuel imports (IHS, 2011). However, the magnitude of these impacts re-
mains amatter of controversy. Kinnaman (2011) notes that largemacro-
economic beneﬁts estimates rest on disputable assumptions, notably
concerning the redistribution of shale oil and gas royalties.
Still, the large impact of growing U.S. shale production on world
energymarkets (IEA, 2014) has raised the question of its reproducibilityin other regions of the world. Hilaire et al. (2015) estimate the global
share of technically recoverable resources that can be considered eco-
nomically recoverable using a bottom-up estimate of the levelized
costs of shale gas extraction based on publicly available U.S. data. They
ﬁnd that under realistic assumptions, “only 39% ofworldwide technical-
ly recoverable resources” could be economically extracted.
The issue of whether shale gas can be economically produced is
especially relevant in continental Europe, where the existence of
potentially large shale deposits has fostered speculation on whether
the oft-called “shale revolution” could be duplicated on the continent.
This issue is particularly acute for natural gas, as European dependency
on foreign exports has important energy security and geopolitical ram-
iﬁcations, notably vis-à-vis the Russian Federation (IEA, 2012).
The case of the United Kingdom deserves a separate treatment, as
the policy environment there is more conducive to the development
of shale gas extraction (Cotton et al., 2014). The ﬁrst test wells were
drilled in 2016, which will provide data that would allow a direct esti-
mation of the proﬁtability of producing shale gas in the U.K. without
resorting to the methodology presented in this paper. This study will
therefore focus on assessing the economic potential of the main conti-
nental shale gas plays, in France, Denmark, the Netherlands and
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Fig. 1. Types of well production decline (q0=1000, D0=15%).Germany. Poland will not be considered, as the clay content in its shale
deposits has thus far proved too high (above 40%) to make hydraulic
fracturing feasible.
A number of studies have considered this topic. Gény (2010) exam-
ines the technical feasibility of shale gas extraction in Europe by identi-
fying the key drivers of the U.S. shale boom and comparing them to the
state of the existing Europeanoil and gas industry. The author concludes
that large differences in terms of onshore drilling industry maturity,
ease of access to land, mineral ownership rights and environmental reg-
ulations make the U.S. operational and business model for shale gas de-
velopment inapplicable to the European context. Further, absent a focus
on “geological sweet spots” (locations of highest well productivity) and
“new technology developments”, shale gas production would not be
proﬁtable at the $10/MMBtu price point in Europe. Similarly, Pearson
et al. (2012) estimate, using assumptions on well productivity and dril-
ling costs derived from the literature, that European shale gas develop-
ment can only be successful if “the environmental and economic
boundary conditions can be fulﬁlled”. The report ﬁnds breakeven prices
in the $8 to $12/MMBtu range inGermany. On the samenote, Spencer et
al. (2014) perform a qualitative assessment of the factors driving shale
gas production projections in Europe and ﬁnd that “[i]t is unlikely that
the EU will repeat the US experience in terms of the scale of unconven-
tional oil and gas production”. Vollebergh and Drissen (2014)review
existing studies and also conclude that economical extraction of shale
gas is unlikely in Europe,while indirect impacts on energy prices - nota-
bly through reduced coal prices - fromU.S. shale production are likely to
be larger on the European economy than any potential domestic shale
production.
In contrast, Weijermars (2013) conducts an economic analysis of
ﬁve continental European shale gas plays and concludes that two of
the ﬁve plays considered could be proﬁtably extracted at 10$/MMBtu.
However one of these was the Polish deposit, which has since been
proven uneconomic. Further, this analysis is hampered by the use of a
simple exponential decline model, which is not applicable to the pro-
duction proﬁle of shale gas wells (Patzek et al., 2013), and of a single
samplemean over historical U.S. production data to calibratewell's EUR.
These previous analyses have been hindered by the lack of data on
the geology of European shale deposits, on the productivity of shale
gas wells and on drilling costs in Europe. In the present paper, we pro-
pose to compensate for this absence of data by developing a techno-
economic model of shale gas production amenable to direct estimation
on the full distribution of U.S. historical production data. Thus, to cali-
brate well performance in our model, we do not solely rely on a litera-
ture review but instead contribute an extensive dataset accounting for
nearly 90% of the shale gas production in the six main U.S. plays from
2004 to 2014. This dataset of 40,571 wells covers the entire distribution
of well performance across the six plays that have accounted for 93% of
U.S. shale gas production over the period considered. In this respect, this
analysis also extends the existing literature on U.S. shale gas plays eco-
nomics (Gülen et al., 2013; Ikonnikova et al., 2015a, 2015b).
As such, even though the geology of shale plays could differ in
Europe from their U.S. counterparts, the analysis of American shale gas
production can provide realistic distributional assumptions for the
main parameters driving well productivity. In contrast with previous
European-focused analyses, our rich datasetallows us to consider the
full heterogeneity of these parameters by directly estimating their dis-
tribution on U.S. historical production data. We also identify assump-
tions for drilling costs and operational costs, which we adapt to the
speciﬁcities of the European context. These assumptions can then be
used to estimate the gross breakeven price distribution of the potential
shale gas resources of continental Europe. However, we do not consider
potential external costs, notably environmental, that can be associated
with shale gas extraction (Henriet and Schubert, 2015).
The paper is structured as follows: we ﬁrst present a techno-
economic model to analyze the main determinants of the proﬁtability
of shale gas wells. We then perform a detailed analysis of N40,000shale gas wells over a decade of U.S. production data in leading shale
plays, in order to calibrate the model. We also examine the particulari-
ties of the European context that have a bearing on the technical and
economic assumptions used.We then present aMonte-Carlo simulation
to estimate the distribution of breakeven prices for shale gas production
in continental Europe based on our previous analysis of U.S. data and
European speciﬁcities. Finally, after conducting an extensive sensitivity
analysis, we conclude.
2. Modeling shale production
In order to model shale production scenarios in Europe and identify
the main parameters that determine the cost of the production ﬂow
alongwith its volume, we develop a techno-economic model amenable
to direct estimation on U.S. historical production data. This section
presents the model and speciﬁes its equations.
2.1. Production proﬁle of a single well
Oil and gas wells follow a well-identiﬁed production proﬁle during
their life cycle (Arps, 1944). Their production ﬂow usually reaches its
maximum early on, and then decreases at a decline rate that can vary
over the well's lifespan.
This production proﬁle has been characterized by Arps (1944). In its
most generic formulation, the production of a well can be expressed as
follows:
q tð Þ ¼ q0
1
1þ bD0tð Þ
1
b
ð1Þ
where q0 is the initial production rate, D0 the initial decline rate, and
b(0≤b≤1) a parameter controlling the evolution of the decline rate
over time. The parameter b notably determines the type of decline
(see Fig. 1):
• exponential(b=0), where production decreases over timewith a con-
stant decline rate. If this decline rate is high, most of the production is
front-loaded over the ﬁrst years of exploitation;
• hyperbolic(0bbb1), where the decline rate decreases over time. If this
decrease is fast enough, the impact of high initial decline rates on the
well's production can be balanced by a longer well lifespan;
• harmonic(b=1), which is a special case of hyperbolic decline. It is the
slowest of all three types of declines, i.e. the one that yields the largest
late-life production ﬂows.
This equation highlights the most important parameters when esti-
mating the expected output of a well over its entire lifespan: the well's
initial production rate and the dynamic of the decline rate over the
well's life cycle.
While the trajectory of shale gaswells production over time exhibits
the same initial production peak and subsequent decline observed in
conventional natural gas wells production, the physics governing the
evolution of the pressure in the shale gas deposit are different from
that of a conventional reservoir, for which the Arps equation was origi-
nally conceived (Patzek et al., 2013). This makes using the classic Arps
equation difﬁcult, as decline rates may not evolve smoothly or strictly
monotonically over time. To overcome this issue, we shall consider in
this paper a discretized version of the empirical Arps equation with a
varying monthly decline rate1, to estimate the monthly production of
the wells that will be modeled. Discretizing Eq. (1) over time allows
for thenon-parametric estimation of thedecline rate dynamic on histor-
ical production data. Using a decline rate with respect to the previous
month's production of δi in month i2, the production for month n can
be expressed as:
qn ¼ q0
Yn
i¼0
1−δið Þ ð2Þ
The total production over the well's lifetime, Tw, which amounts to
its Estimated Ultimate Recovery (EUR), becomes:
Qwell ¼ q0
XTw
n¼0
Yn
i¼0
1−δið Þ ð3Þ
If we then suppose that drilling costs amount to I, the operational
cost per unit of production amounts to c (following the literature3, we
assume that operational costs are constant over time), and the whole-
sale price amounts to p, the Net Present Value (NPV) of this production
is, for a discount rate of r:
NPVwell ¼ q0 p−cð Þ
XTw
n¼0
Qn
i¼0 1−δið Þ
1þ rð Þn −I ð4Þ
The gross breakeven price excluding taxes and royalties, p∗, corre-
sponds to the price for which this NPV is zero. From Eq. (4), we ﬁnd
p∗, which can be split into a marginal component and a ﬁxed costs com-
ponent which amortizes the initial drilling costs:
p ¼ cþ I
q0∑
Tw
n¼0
Qn
i¼0 1−δið Þ
1þ rð Þn
ð5Þ
3. Analysis of U.S. production data
Calibrating the equation describing the production proﬁle of the
representativewell (Eq. (2)) requires detailed knowledge of the geolog-
ical characteristics of the play considered. Large uncertainties remain in
Europe over the actual volume of resources in place and of technically
and commercially recoverable reserves (IFPEN, 2013). Besides, since
only around ﬁfty experimental wells have been drilled on the continent
so far (Spencer et al., 2014), production data has yet to be made
available publicly.
It is therefore necessary to calibrate our model using data from a
different source. Ever since the commercial extraction of shale
deposits began during the last decade, close to sixty shale gas plays
have been drilled in the United States(Hughes, 2013). Thirty out1 The derivation of the discretized Eq. (2) is available in the Supplementary Online 
Material.
2 In Eqs. (2) through (5), δ0=0.
3 See in particular Hilaire et al. (2015), Gülen et al. (2013) and Ikonnikova et al. (2015a,
2015b).ofthese sixty plays have proved proﬁtable, with only six of those
accounting for 93% of the total natural gas production from shale
deposits in the United States (EIA, 2015). Production data from
North American plays thus covers a wide variety of distinct geologi-
cal conﬁgurations. A detailed analysis of this data can provide a basis
for the calibration of our model. This approach does assume that
European shale deposits would be at least as amenable to extraction
by hydraulic fracturing as their U.S. counterparts. This may be a
strong hypothesis, as illustrated by the example of Poland- where
high clay content in the shale deposits prevented their extraction.
The estimates we derive in the rest of this paper should therefore
be considered upper boundaries on the potential proﬁtability of
shale gas extraction in the European context.
We present here the results of analyses conducted on an exten-
sive dataset collected from production reports provided by shale
gas operators in North America's largest plays, in Barnett, Eagle
Ford, Fayetteville, Haynesville, Marcellus and Woodford. The
datawas obtained from the Arkansas Oil and Gas Commission, the
Louisiana Department of Natural Resources, the Pennsylvania
Department of Environmental Protection, the Texas Railroad
Commission, covers N40,000 wells and accounts for nearly 90% of
the total shale gas production in the six plays considered over the
period 2004–2014. This data allows deriving a very accurate picture
of shale well production proﬁles. Using this information, we can
estimate the full distribution of the key parameters of Eq. (2), initial
production rate and decline rates.3.1. Initial production rate
We ﬁrst estimate the mean initial production rate of wells in each
play, and examine its evolution over time by vintage. Production is re-
ported at ﬁxed dates (usually at the beginning of each month), which
introduces a potential source of bias as wells which begin extraction
within the course of a reporting period would not report a full month
of production in their ﬁrst reporting period4. To rectify this issue, we
consider initial production as the maximum production over the ﬁrst
two months of extraction. Results are presented in Fig. 2.
We ﬁnd that the evolution of initial production over time exhibits a
common pattern in ﬁve of the six plays under consideration. In a ﬁrst
period, which spans durations ranging from ﬁve years (2004 to 2009)
in Barnett to three years (2008 to 2010) in Haynesville, average initial
productions gradually increase with drilling year. Initial productions
then stabilize on a plateau. Barnett, which is the oldest andmost exten-
sively drilled shale gas play in the U.S., also shows indications of a pos-
sible third phase during which initial production rates begin to
progressively decline. Eagle Ford, Fayetteville andHaynesville all appear
to have reached their plateau, while Marcellus is seemingly still in the
ﬁrst phase of this lifecycle. However, this pattern is less clear in the
Woodford, where initial production rates have proven more volatile
over time, with a spike in 2014. This could be explained by the smaller
number of wells drilled in that year leading to a non-representative
mean initial production estimate, with only 204 wells beginning pro-
duction in 2014 out of a total sample size of 3015 for the Woodford
play. Still, further analysis is warranted to fully explain the dynamics
observed.
An increase in initial production rates leads to improved well
productivity, provided that decline rates remain constant across drilling
years (see next section). Indeed, a simultaneous increase of decline4 In the case of the Marcellus play, the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental
Protection only enforces biannual reporting of production. For this particular play, we cal-
culate initial production rate as theproduction in theﬁrst reporting periodobserved divid-
ed by the number of production days. This may introduce a small downward bias, as the
decline rate observed.
Barnett 
Source: Texas Railroad Commission / Author’s calculations
Eagle Ford 
Source: Texas Railroad Commission / Author’s calculations
Fayetteville 
Source: Arkansas Oil and Gas Commission / Author’s calculations
Haynesville 
Source: Louisiana Dpt. of Natural Resources / Author’s calculations
Marcellus 
Source: Pennsylvania Dpt. of Environmental Protection /   
Author’s calculations
Woodford 
Source: Oklahoma Corporation Commission / Author’s calculations
Fig. 2. Initial production rate bywell vintage. In each chart, the lower side of the box corresponds to the 25th percentile, the upper side to 75th, and the boldmiddle line to themedian. The
whisker extends to the lowest and highest values comprised within one and half time the interquartile range (p75–p25).rates over time could cancel out the impact of improved initial produc-
tions over the well's total lifecycle production.
Increasing initial production can be driven by at least two causes: an
improvement in extraction and fracturing technologies, which leads to
an increase in recovery rates of natural gas from the shale resource
(EIA, 2015); and a better knowledge of the ﬁeld's geology, notably the
identiﬁcation of so-called “sweet spots” - regions of the play where
well productivity tends to be optimal - which once found concentrate
the drilling activity, thereby increasing average well productivity in
the play (EIA, 2011). In both cases, this ﬁrst period of increasing well
productivity can be understood as a learning phase, either at the playlevel - during which operators increase their geological knowledge of
the shale play, - or at the industry level - whereby technologies used
to extract shale deposits are improved simultaneously across all plays.
Further researchwill be needed to distinguish the relative contributions
of each of these factors in the observed overall increase in well produc-
tivity over time.
In four of the six plays under consideration, once the learning phase
is over, mean initial production rate reaches a stable level that has been
roughly maintained to the present, although the variance of initial pro-
duction rates has varied over time in each play. This process is still
under way in the Marcellus, which exhibited strong year-on-year
Table1
Mean initial production rate of awell in the six largest shale gas plays in theU.S. by vintage
(2010–2014, in Mcf/day).
Year of IP Haynesville Barnett Marcellus Fayetteville Eagle Ford Woodford
2010 8632 2093 2272 2385 2461 3542
2011 8076 2138 3720 2361 2641 2436
2012 6977 1849 3815 2479 2596 2561
2013 7082 1801 5754 2540 2538 2253
2014 6939 1675 6560 2777 2554 4032growth in initial production rates over the entire period. Table 1 pro-
vides the mean initial production observed in each of the six largest
U.S. shale gas plays for the ﬁve most recent well vintages, from 2010
to 2014.Barnett
Fayetteville
Woodford 
Fig. 3.Mean ratio of current to initial pro3.2. Decline rates
Monthly production data allows us to estimate well decline proﬁles.
Fig. 3 shows the evolution over time of mean production rates normal-
ized by the initial production rate, for eachwell vintage. Decline proﬁles
are provided for every play considered except Marcellus, where no
monthly data was available, as the Pennsylvania Department of Envi-
ronmental Protection only mandates that production data be reported
twice a year.
Decline proﬁles are characterized by high decline rates in the ﬁrst
years of production in all of the plays: after one year, the mean produc-
tion of a shale gas well has declined between 47% and 59%. Second and
third year year-on-year decline rates remain high, ranging from 23% to
39% and 17% to 30% respectively.Eagle Ford
Haynesville
10th to 90th percentile 
25th to 75th percentile  
duction rate over time, by vintage.
Table2
Mean year-on-year decline rates.
Year
1
Year
2
Year
3
Year
4
Year
5
Year
6
Year
7
Year
8
Year
9
Year
10
Barnett 58% 28% 19% 17% 12% 12% 10% 10% 6% 3%
Eagle Ford 58% 31% 28% 16% 16% – – – – –
Fayetteville 57% 33% 24% 18% 13% 16% 12% 3% – –
Haynesville 59% 39% 30% 18% 14% 10% – – – –
Woodford 47% 23% 17% 14% 9% 3% 10% 19% 7% –
Fig. 4. First-year decline rate as a function of initial production rate by play and vintage.In addition to these trajectories, we also perform a non-parametric
estimate5 of monthly decline rates δn (see Eq. (2)). Table 2 presents an-
nualized year-on-year decline rates resulting from this estimate in each
of the plays:
While decline rates do exhibit some heterogeneity between plays,
the variance inmean decline proﬁles across shale gas producing regions
is signiﬁcantly smaller than that of initial productions. However, the
variance within a single play can be substantial, as illustrated by the in-
terquartile spread observed in the Eagle Ford, Haynesville and
Woodford plays. Yet, the mean decline trend over time is stable across
drilling years. This indicates that unlike initial production rates, the av-
erage well's production proﬁle does not exhibit a learning phase after
which observed decline rates would be reduced. It can therefore be as-
sumed that the decline rates distribution estimated over the whole
lifespan of a given play is also applicable to its most recent wells.
We also ﬁnd that in general, the decline of production cannot be de-
scribed as either exponential, since the annual decline rate varies over
the well's lifespan, nor hyperbolic, since decline rates are neither con-
stant nor do they decrease strictly monotonically over time.
Finally our separate estimates of initial production rates and decline
rates have thus far assumed that these two parameters were indepen-
dent. We verify this assumption by plotting initial production rate by
vintage against ﬁrst-year decline rate by vintage (see Fig. 4), and
performing a HoeffdingD test (Hoeffding, 1948) on these two variables.
With a D statistic of−0.008, we can conclude that initial productions
and decline rates are indeed independent.
4. Speciﬁcities of the European context
4.1. Gas price formation
The large drop in natural gas prices over the past decade, from a
weekly average high of 14.49$/MMBtu in December 2005 to a low of
1.86$/MMBtu in April 20126, has been one of the more signiﬁcant
consequences of the large increase in domestic gas production in the
United States.
Unlike other energy commodities, crude oil in particular, themarket
for natural gas is still fragmented into several regional markets. The
price of natural gas is therefore different in the United States, Europe
and East Asia (IEA, 2012). Hence, the decrease in gas price resulting
from the growth of shale gas production has remained localized in the
United States.
This is due in large part to the difﬁculty of transporting natural gas.
Across oceans, where pipelines cannot be used, natural gas must be
liqueﬁed and transported in LNG tankers. This entails building very
expensive processing facilities to liquefy the gas on departure, and gas-
ify it back on arrival - taking into account liquefaction, shipping costs
and regasiﬁcation, LNG transportation adds upwards of $2 per Mcf to5 In production month n, the mean decline rate δn in a given play is estimated as the
mean of decline rates between production months n and n−1 over all the wells that pro-
duced at least until production month n. This estimation procedure ensures that δn is esti-
mated over wells that were producing both in month n and in month n−1. Taking a
simple mean production proﬁle to estimate decline rates would result in calculating a de-
cline between all wells that produced in months n or n−1, even when some wells in
month n−1 were no longer active in month n – and would therefore be inconsistent.
6 Henry Hub Natural Gas Spot Price, weekly averages. Source: U.S. EIA.the cost of supplying natural gas (Mokhatab et al., 2014). In addition,
processing plants used for liquefaction cannot be used for gasiﬁcation
without costly retroﬁtting (IGU, 2012).
Besides, gas price formation mechanisms are distinct in each of the
major markets. In the United States, the price of natural gas is set
through gas-on-gas competition. Natural gas is traded over a variety of
time frames (e.g. daily, monthly or annually) at a number of physical
hubs - Louisiana's Henry Hub being the largest, - and the interplay of
supply and demand determines the price. In such a market, changes in
the balance between supply and demand have an immediate impact
on prices. The United States, which until the late 2000s expected do-
mestic natural gas production to decline, had built LNG plants to import
gas, but not to export it (EIA, 2011). When shale gas extraction rapidly
grew, the newfound domestic production of natural gas changed the
local balance of supply and demand immediately. From 2008 to 2012,
domestic production grew at a rate of 3.6% per annum, outpacing con-
sumption, which only grew at 2.3% per annum7: this led to the large
drop in prices.
In Europe, gas price formation follows a different mechanism.
Traditionally, European natural gas supplies have been priced through
a mix of long-term contracts with producing countries and spot market
pricing. Long-term contracts are mostly priced using a mechanism
known as oil price escalation, whereby gas prices are linked, usually
through a base price and an escalation clause, to the price of competing
fuels - typically crude oil (IGU, 2012). Oil price escalation used to dom-
inate natural gas price formation in Europe. However, since the late
2000s, oil indexation of natural gas contracts has been decreasing: as
of 2012, 51% of European gas consumption was priced through an oil
price escalation clause, down from 59% in 2010. Meanwhile, from
2007 to 2012, spot-priced natural gas volumes have doubled, to reach
44% of consumption (EC, 2013).
This pricing structure makes European wholesale gas prices less
elastic to changes in the balance of supply and demand. While an in-
crease in domestic production could improve the bargaining power of
European countries with their suppliers, the impact of introducing
small volumes of domestic shale gas production in the European supply
mix on gas prices is unclear.4.2. Drilling costs
Public data on drilling costs is scarce, which makes their calibration
difﬁcult. According to the U.S. EIA, drilling costs per well in the leading
shale plays of Marcellus, Bakken and Eagle Ford are comprised between7 Source: U.S. EIA Natural Gas statistics.
Table3
Average drilling costs and depth of the main U.S. shale plays.
Fayetteville Marcellus Barnett Haynesville Woodford
Average drilling costs
(million USD)
2.8 5.3 3.5 9.9 8.5
Average depth (ft) 3600 6200 7900 12,100 13,100
Source:Kaiser and Yu (2015), Nickelson (2013), Berman and Pittinger (2011).$6.5 and $9 million, including both horizontal drilling and hydraulic
fracturing (EIA, 2012).
However, these estimates cannot be used directly in the European
context. Notably, one of the main drivers of drilling costs is the depth
of the well and the length of its lateral (Pulsipher, 2007). Table 3
presents average drilling costs and average depth in the main U.S.
shale plays.
As shown in the above table, themost expensive wells are located in
the deepest shale deposits, between 10,000 and 13,000 ft. on average,
indicating a relationship between drilling costs and average deposit
depth. Most continental European deposits have been identiﬁed in geo-
logical strata located at comparable depth: the majority of the French
resources would be found between 10,000 and 14,000 ft., between
10,000 and 12,500 ft. in Poland, between 11,500 and 14,500 ft. in
Germany, between 11,000 and 12,500 ft. in theNetherlands, and around
11,000 ft. in Spain; only British shale deposits would be located at a
shallower depth of 8000 ft.(EIA, 2013).
These elements lead us to estimate that drilling costs will on av-
erage be higher in Europe than in the United States. This is indeed
the conclusion ofWoodMackenzie (2012) on the economic potential
of shale gas resources in the United Kingdom, which estimated that
should the British shale resources be developed, the average drilling
costs would reach $17 million. This would amount to more than one
and a half times the average well cost in the Haynesville, where
drilling costs are the highest of any American play. Oil services
company Schlumberger also estimated in 2011 that drilling costs
inPoland could turn out to be three times higher than in the United
States8.
Finally, it should be noted that the availability of drilling equipment
ismuch higher in theUnited States than in Europe. In theﬁrst quarter of
2014, N1700 drilling rigs were being operated in the United States, in-
cluding both oil and gas plays of the conventional and unconventional
varieties (EIA, 2014). This is to be contrasted with less than a hundred
rigs available across the entire European continent in 2011 (Hsieh,
2011). Further, only a small fraction of these rigs can be used to drill
shale gas wells: for example, in 2011, out of 15 drilling rigs available
in Poland, only 5 were suitable to shale gas extraction9. An important
component of drilling and completion costs, the day rate for drilling
equipment rental, is a function of the demand for drilling rigs: with
the rapid fall of oil prices in the second semester of 2014, drilling rates
fell quickly across the U.S., reducing the day rates for U.S. land rig
suitable for use in shale plays by 31% between November 2014 and
July 201510. Capacity constraints could thus make well drilling costlier
and limit the drilling rate in European countries, at least in the ﬁrst
years of production.4.3. Regulatory environment
In addition to the improvements made to hydraulic fracturing and
horizontal drilling technologies, the expansion of commercial shale
gas extractionwas also accompanied by changesmade to the regulatory8 “Shale-Gas Drilling Cost in Poland Triple U.S., Schlumberger Says”, Bloomberg, 29
November 2011.
9 Ibid.
10 Source: Bloomberg Intelligence, July 2015.framework governing oil and gas production - especially regarding en-
vironmental regulations.
Indeed, the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (Pub.L. 109-58, 2005) brought
some signiﬁcant modiﬁcations to the environmental legislations regu-
lating oil and gas drilling in the United States. Passed at a time when
conventional gas plays were exhibiting signs of depletion (EIA, 2005),
the Energy Policy Act deﬁned new core principles for American energy
policy, with a particular emphasis on reducing future dependency on
fossil fuel imports. The Act included a number of measures aiming
to increase domestic fossil fuel production. Notably, two existing
environmental laws were amended to facilitate the use of hydraulic
fracturing - and thus the extraction of oil and gas from shale deposits:
• the Safe Drinking Water Act (Pub. L. 93-523, 1974), which regu-
lates the public drinking water supply, and ensures its quality
and suitability for human consumption. Originally, this Act banned
any drilling in the vicinity of underground water reservoirs.
Section322 of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 lifts this ban for oil
and gas drilling.
• The Clean Water Act (Pub. L. 92-500, 1972), which governs water
pollution. This Act notably deﬁnes what constitutes a water pollut-
ant. Through an amendment to section 502 of the CleanWater Act,
the Energy Policy Act of 2005 excludes from this deﬁnition “water,
gas, or other material which is injected into a well to facilitate pro-
duction of oil or gas”.
These changes, made to two pillars of the environmental regulatory
framework of the United States, have facilitated the widespread use of
hydraulic fracturing, and thus the shale revolution. Without the chemi-
cal additives that were formerly listed as pollutants by the CleanWater
Act, hydraulic fracturing would be less effective, and well productivity
would be lower.
Environmental regulations in Europe are much stricter on these
points. In particular, the use of chemical additives in the fracturing
ﬂuid, the transportation and storage of ﬂowback water and drilling
mud from well fracturing, or the drilling of wells within proximity to
water reservoirs or inhabitations would all be very difﬁcult or outright
forbidden under the current European environmental legislation, both
at the Union and Member State level (Gény, 2010). Other measures
targeting both safety and environmental protection, such as standards
of safety valves and the compulsoriness of multiple casings around the
well's body, would have a direct impact on drilling costs.
At this stage, it is impossible to know whether the European Union
or some of its Member States will amend their existing legislations to
lift some of the restrictions currently limiting the use of hydraulic frac-
turing. Fostering shale gas production on their territory would entail
rescinding part of their environmental protection framework to favor
domestic on shore drilling, as the Energy Policy Act did in the United
States in 2005. Currently, compliance with the local legislation would
lead to signiﬁcantly higher drilling costs in Europe than in the United
States(Gény, 2010).
5. Estimating breakeven prices in Europe
In this section, we determine whether shale gas could be proﬁtably
produced in continental Europe by estimating the distribution of break-
even prices for shale gas extraction.We consider the potential shale gas
reserves of France (unproved technically recoverable resources of 137
Tcf), Denmark (32 Tcf), Netherlands (26 Tcf) and Germany (17 Tcf) in
the aggregate (EIA, 2013). We exclude Poland, the largest potential
holder of shale gas resources in Europe, as high clay content (above
40%) in the shale deposits make extraction impractical using current
technology. Besides, these scenarios assume that the current regulatory
obstacles preventing shale gas production in France, Germany and the
Netherlands could be lifted.
5.1. Assumptions
According to Eq. (5), the breakeven price of a shale gaswell is deter-
mined by initial production rate, decline rates over time, and drilling
and completion costs. The U.S. shale gas plays analyzed in the previous
sections exhibited signiﬁcant variance in all three of these determinants
both within and between plays.
To account for this heterogeneity, we derive distributional assump-
tions for each model parameter from the statistical analysis performed
in Section 3 and the discussion conducted in Section 4. Following
Ikonnikova et al. (2015a, 2015b) and Hilaire et al. (2015), we then per-
form a Monte-Carlo simulation to estimate the distribution of shale gas
wells breakeven prices under these assumptions. Values are drawn
from the distribution of each model parameter using Sobol low-
discrepancyquasi-random sequences to simulate 50,000 wells. The
resulting distribution of breakeven prices is then derived from these
simulations.
5.1.1. Initial production rate
Using the dataset analyzed in Section 3, we can estimate the full dis-
tribution of initial well production rates in the six largest commercially
developed plays in the U.S. However, by construction, this distribution
excludes all wells drilled in plays that performed more poorly than
the top six - this hypothesis is therefore equivalent to considering that
the distribution of wells drilled in continental Europe will be on par
with the performance recorded in the six best U.S. shale gas plays.
We also observed that initial production rate was initially increasing
on average with each well generation, until it stabilized - which could
result from improving technology and/or better knowledge of the
plays' geology. It is likely that shale gas extraction in continental
Europe would beneﬁt from most of this technological improvement.
Estimating the distribution over our full sample - including earlier
wells drilled with less advanced technology - would therefore lead to
a downward bias on the well performance. Besides, we noted that
four of the six plays considered (which account for 70% of the shale
gas produced from 2010 to 2014) had reached the stabilization phase
by 2010. To reduce the risk of downward bias while maintaining a
large sample size, we thus use the probability distribution of initial pro-
duction rates over wells that started producing from 2010 to 2014.
5.1.2. Decline rates
We found in Section 3 that decline rates were stable across drilling
years.We thus calibrate the decline rates used in Eq. (2) on the distribu-
tion of decline proﬁles observed in our entire dataset, using the same
non-parametric estimation used for individual plays.
The mean decline rates derived from this distribution are presented
in Table 4 for illustration purposes. While monthly decline rates are
used in the model, annualized year-on-year decline rates are provided
for clarity. Decline rates beyond the tenth year of production are
drawn from the distribution of year 10.
5.1.3. Drilling and completion costs
Wenoted in our analysis of drilling and completion costs that poten-
tial shale deposits in continental Europe were located at a depth
comparable - or deeper - to that of the Haynesville, Eagle Ford and
Woodford plays, and that drilling costs were linked to the depth of the
deposit. A number of other factors, such as the geometry of the rock
formation or the type of fracturing ﬂuid to be used, are important
drivers of drilling and completion costs. However, given the currentTable4
Annualized year-on-year mean decline rates.
Year
1
Year
2
Year
3
Year
4
Year
5
Year
6
Year
7
Year
8
Year
9
Year
10
58% 30% 22% 17% 12% 11% 10% 10% 6.1% 3.3%lack of experimental drilling in potential shale gas ﬁelds in continental
Europe, it is impossible for now to calibrate these other factors.
We therefore assume a minimum for drilling costs in Europe of $10
million, comparable to that observed in the Haynesville (Kaiser and Yu,
2015). Yet, the speciﬁcities of the continental European context, namely
its lack of well-developedon-shore drilling infrastructure and its more
stringent environmental regulations could increase this cost. In particu-
lar, there is a large uncertainty on the level of compliance costs
necessary to meet the requirements of the body of environmental
rules enforced at the European Union level. We therefore consider a
mean cost hypothesis 50% higher ($15 million per well). It should be
noted that this assumption is still below Wood Mackenzie's (2012)
$17 million average cost per well estimate for the United Kingdom. To
account for the uncertainty on this important parameter, we assume
that drilling and completion costs are distributed following a normal
distribution left truncated at 10million, withmean 15million and stan-
dard deviation of 2 million.
5.1.4. Productive lifetime of a well
Given that the overwhelming majority of shale gas wells have been
drilled for less than ten years, their ultimate lifetime is not currently ob-
servable. Assumptions in the literature vary signiﬁcantly: Hilaire et al.
(2015) considered a mean expected productive lifetime of 10 years,
while other studies have considered 14-year (Weijermars, 2013) and
up to 20-year wells (Ikonnikova et al., 2015a, 2015b). Recognizing the
uncertainty on this parameter, wemodel it following a normal distribu-
tion left truncated at 10 years with mean 15 years and standard devia-
tion of 5 years.
5.1.5. Other parameters
Operating costs, cm, have been estimated by Moniz et al. (2011) be-
tween $0.5 et $1 perMMBtu.We thereforemodel them using a truncat-
ed normal distribution comprised between these two boundaries, with
mean 0.75$ perMMBtu. Finally, we calibrate the discount rate r at 7%, as
is common in the economic literature on resource economics (Arrow et
al., 1996).
5.2. Results
Using this set of assumptions for initial productions, decline rates
and drilling and completion costs, Eq.(5) can estimate breakeven prices
for shale gas extraction. We then conduct a Monte-Carlo simulation to
estimate the probability distribution of breakeven prices of shale gas
production in continental Europe. The resulting cumulative distribution
is presented in Fig. 5. Percentiles at the 10%, 25%, 50%, 75% and 90%
levels are also reported in Table 5.
We ﬁnd that, under our given set of hypotheses, 50% of the wells
drilled in continental Europe would reach gross breakeven (before
taxes and royalties) for a natural gas price of 10.1$/MMBtu. However,
our results also illustrate the large heterogeneity in shale gas well prof-
itability. Indeed, we could expect 10% of all wells to reach breakeven
under 3.5$/MMBtu, while 25% would need natural gas prices above
19.8$/MMBtu to recoup their drilling and operational costs.
To assess the proﬁtability of shale gas extraction along this distribu-
tion of breakeven price points, we confront our results with historical
natural gas price in Europe since 2001 (Fig. 6). We assume that shale
gas producers in continental Europewould not produce enough natural
gas to impact wholesale natural gas price (see Section 4). Natural gas
price has been volatile on the European market over the past 15 years,
varying between a low of 3.6$/MMBtu in May 2002 to a spike of
17.2$/MMbtu in November 200811. If we only consider the past half-
decade, from 2011 to 2016, the average natural gas price in Europe
was 9.4$/MMBtu.11 All prices expressed in 2015 dollars.
Fig. 5. Cumulative breakeven price distribution (Monte-Carlo simulation).At that price point, the median well in our simulations would not
reach gross breakeven: we could instead expect 53% of all wells drilled
to not be proﬁtable before taxes and royalties. The distribution also ex-
hibits a long tail of signiﬁcantly unproﬁtable wells, with 29% of the well
population requiring natural gas prices above the historical maximum
to achieve gross breakeven.
Further, it should be noted that the 2011–2016 period was charac-
terized by higher than average natural gas prices when compared
with previous decades and the most recent year at the time of writing.
Indeed, European natural gas prices averaged 4.6$/MMBtu from
November 2015 to November 2016, 7.6$/MMBtu between 2000 and
2009 and $3.8/MMBtu between 1990 and 1999. In each of these periods
respectively, we could have expected N82%, 63% and 88% of all wells
drilled to not reach breakeven on average.
Importantly, there has not been any continuous 15-year period
overthe past 25 years when natural gas prices in Europe have averaged
N10.1$/MMBtu. Therefore, assuming a mean shale gas well lifespan of
15 years, at no point over the past 25 years could more than half of
shale gas wells drilled in continental Europe have reached gross
breakeven.
5.3. Sensitivity analysis
To assess the robustness of our results, we estimate the sensitivity of
the breakeven price to the physical and economic parameters consid-
ered. Speciﬁcally, we observe the impact on the median breakeven
price of a 10% variation of initial production rates, decline rates, well
lifespan, drilling and completion costs, operating costs and discount
rate around their respectivemedian values. The results of this sensitivity
analysis are presented in Fig. 7.
We ﬁnd that the breakeven price is signiﬁcantly sensitive to geolog-
ical parameters - speciﬁcally the initial production volume and the de-
cline rate. Increasing the initial production rate by 10% reduces the
breakeven by 9% whereas decreasing it by the same amount increases
the breakeven by 10%. Similarly, wells that deplete 10% faster would
have a breakeven price 7% higher, while slowing the decline rate by
10% would reduce the breakeven price by 7%.Table5
Breakeven price percentiles.
Percentile 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th
Breakeven price ($/MMBtu) 3.5 5.7 10.1 19.8 50.1This is expected, as these two geological parameters determine the
total amount of natural gas ultimately extracted (EUR), over which dril-
ling and completion costs can be amortized. However, interestingly, in-
creasing the well lifespan only reduces the breakeven price marginally.
Under ourmedian assumptions of decline rate and discount rate, a shale
gas well operated for 10% longer12 would only achieve breakeven at a
1% lower price point. This stems from the large initial decline rates:
most of a well's EUR is produced in the ﬁrst two to three years of
operation.
The nextmost important hypothesis is drilling and completion costs,
with a sensitivity of breakeven price of ±9% for a ±10% variation. The
remaining economic parameters, discount rate and operational cost,
bear comparatively little impact on the proﬁtability of a shale gas well,
with sensitivities to a ±10% variation conﬁned in the ±2% range.
Finally, we also consider the impact of a simultaneous ±10% varia-
tion of all physical parameters, initial production, decline rates and
well lifespan; of all economic parameters, drilling costs, discount rate
and operating costs; and ﬁnally of all parameters simultaneously. This
complementary analysis conﬁrms that the breakeven price is more
sensitive to physical parameters, with a sensitivity of −15%/+21%,
than to economic parameters whose impact is limited to a ±12%
variation. Finally the joint variation of all parameters yields a sensitivity
of−25%/+35%. This magnitude is comparable to the results found by
Hilaire et al. (2015).
This sensitivity analysis reiterates the central importance of the
three main parameters identiﬁed in our model, initial production, de-
cline rates and drilling and completion costs. The robustness of decline
rate proﬁles across U.S. shale gas plays suggests that a similar produc-
tion proﬁle could be expected in continental Europe. However, it ap-
pears necessary to resolve the uncertainties concerning initial
production rates and drilling and completion costs in Europe if shale
gas is to be extracted commercially on the continent.
5.4. Sensitivity to a correlation between shale depth and well productivity
The analysis conducted in this section assumes that shale gas wells
drilled in continental Europe would exhibit characteristics comparable
to that of the six most productive shale gas plays in the United States.
However, as illustrated in Section 4, three of these plays (Fayetteville,
Marcellus and Barnett) are found at shallower depths than the potential12 This is equivalent to adding 1.6 years of operation to a median well lifespan of
16 years.
Source: World Bank, author 
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Fig. 7. Sensitivity of the median breakeven price to a 10% variation of each parameter.
Fig. 8. Cumulative breakeven price distribution (calibration on deep shale gas plays only).
Table6
Breakeven price percentiles (calibration on deep shale gas plays only).
Percentile 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th
Breakeven price ($/MMBtu) 3.1 4.4 8.4 19.2 61.1shale gas deposits of France, Denmark, Netherlands and Germany. Still,
all six plays are included in the calibration of the model's geological
parameters - most importantly initial production rates.
Conversely, drilling and completion costs assumptions were mainly
calibrated on the most comparable plays by depth, the Haynesville,
Eagle Ford and Woodford. This in turn rests on the hypothesis that the
initial production rate of a well is uncorrelated with its depth. This as-
sumption seems to be supported by the fact that while located at com-
parable average depth, Eagle Ford (10,000 ft), Haynesville (12,100 ft)
and Woodford (13,100 ft) have very different initial production rate
distributions.
Yet, Brown et al. (2016) report a positive correlation between aver-
age well EUR and average shale depth at the county level. Ikonnikova et
al. (2015a, 2015b) also observe a positive link between well depth and
EUR. This correlation could result from the fact that deeper wells are
more expensive to drill and are thus preferentially drilled in the more
promising parts of a play, or it could stem from geological
mechanisms. Regardless of its root cause, a similar correlation could
be observed in continental European shale gas plays.
To test the sensitivity of our results to this last hypothesis, we con-
duct a second Monte-Carlo simulation using a subset of the initial pro-
duction distribution calibrated on the sole Haynesville, Eagle Ford and
Woodford plays. Results are presented in Fig. 8 and Table 6.
We ﬁnd that the median breakeven price is reduced by 15% com-
pared with our main results, but that the variance is higher. In particu-
lar, the 90th percentile breakeven price is 35% higher. When calibrating
the initial production distribution on the deepest U.S. plays only, 54% of
the well distribution reaches gross proﬁtability at the 2011–2016 mean
natural gas price, 7 percentage points higher than in the main simula-
tion. Thus, while marginally improving the proﬁtability outlook, assum-
ing that European shale gas plays would share the same initial
production rate distribution as American plays of similar depth does
not modify our main ﬁnding.
6. Conclusion
To assess whether the American shale gas revolution can be
duplicated in Europe, we have determined the main drivers of shale
gas extraction proﬁtability. To this end, we have presented a techno-
economic model of shale gas production that allowed us to identify
the following key parameters: well productivity, as described by initial
production and decline rates, and drilling and completion costs.
The volume and geological characteristics of shale gas resources in
Europe remain speculative. Besides, experimental drilling has remained
very scarce. It is therefore not possible to assess well productivity in the
potential European shale gas plays. At this stage, we cannot directly cal-
ibrate our model on European production data.
To remedy this lack of data, we contribute a detailed statistical anal-
ysis of an extensive dataset of 40,000 wells, which accounts for nearly
90% of the production of the six largest American shale gas plays over
the period 2004–2014. We then analyze the speciﬁcities of the
European context, notably in terms of gas price formation, drilling
costs and environmental regulations.
Based on these analyses, we estimate the distribution of initial pro-
duction rates and decline rates, and derive assumptions for drilling
and completion costs in continental Europe- under the premise that
the geology of the corresponding shale deposits proves conducive to
the commercial extraction of shale gas. Using our model, we ﬁnd a me-
dian gross breakeven price before taxes and royalties of 10.1$/MMBtu.
This is higher than themean European natural gas price over the period2011–2016. Further, 29% of the well distribution requires a breakeven
price higher than the maximum historical natural gas price in
Europe.The assessment is worse considering the most recent price
trends,with 82% of the distribution unproﬁtable at themean 2016 price.
Thus, considering both recent and historical natural gas prices on the
continent, shale gas production does not appear proﬁtable. A sensitivity
analysis on the model's parameters reveals that the breakeven price is
most sensitive to initial production rate, drilling and completion costs
and decline rates. Median breakeven price decreases by 15% when as-
suming that European shale gas plays would have productivity charac-
teristics similar to that of U.S. plays of comparable depth. Still, even
under this hypothesis, only 54% the well distribution would be grossly
proﬁtable before royalties and taxes at the 2011–2016 mean price.
Thus, it appears that an expansion of shale gas production on a scale
comparable to the American experience over the past decade cannot be
reproduced in Europe at present. Only under themost favorable geolog-
ical conﬁgurations could shale gas extraction prove signiﬁcantly proﬁt-
able in Europe.
Absent extreme well productivity, or a technological improvement
that would lower drilling costs or increase recovery rateswhile comply-
ing with local environmental regulations, it appears very difﬁcult for
shale gas extraction to have a signiﬁcant impact on European energy
markets.
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